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COMMENT
THE OHIO GUEST STATUTE
As the use of automobiles became almost universal, the proverbial
ingratitude of the dog that bites the hand that feeds him, found a
counterpart in the many cases that arose, where generous drivers,
having offered rides to guests, later found themselves defendants
in cases that often turned upon close questions of negligence. Un-
doubtedly the Legislature[s], in adopting [the guest statutes]
reflected a certain natural feeling as to the injustice of such a
situation.1
INTRODUCTION
The Ohio General Assembly in 1933 enacted the Ohio Guest
Statute, section 4515.02 of the Ohio Revised Code (section 6309-6
G.C.), in response to a general feeling of animosity toward "hitch-
hikers" and other guests bringing personal injury actions against the
"good Samaritan" motorist. It was also hoped that such legislation
would prevent fraud and collusion feared to be inherent in "guest
suits." The statute itself reads as follows:
The owner, operator or person responsible for the operation of a
motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from
injuries to or death of a guest, resulting from the operation of said
motor vehicle, while such guest is being transported without pay-
ment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, unless such injuries
or death are caused by the wilful or wanton misconduct of such
operator, owner, or person responsible for the operation of said
motor vehicle.2
After a quarter-century of existence, the Ohio Guest Statute has
been characterized as a "treadmill of confusion."3 Such characteriza-
tion justifies the present Ohio courts' position as to their interpretation
of "guest" and "wilful or wanton" within the statute. However, the
question remains as to whether this confusion is solely attributable to
incongruous judicial interpretation or is a consequence of the equivocal
nature of any guest legislation.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GUEST LEGISLATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
1. General
At common law an occupant of an automobile was normally per-
mitted to recover for injuries proximately caused by the driver's negli-
1 Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 293 Pac. 841, 843 (1930).
2 Section 4515.02, Ohio Rev. Code (1953).
3 For an excellent discussion of the Ohio Guest Statute and especially the courts'
interpretation of wilful or wanton misconduct, see Comment "Treadmill to Confusion-
Ohio Guest Statute," 8 W. Res. L. Rev. 170 (1957).
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gent conduct, although in Massachusetts, New Jersey and Pennsyl-
vania the driver's duty to his occupants was partially limited without
the benefit of a statute.4 Most states analyzed the automobile host-
guest relationship as being similar to the host-guest relationship of
real property, namely that of licensor-licensee. Thus the host was not
legally obligated to inspect the automobile in order to guarantee its
safety, but his only duty was not to increase existing hazards or be
responsible for new ones once the journey began. In 1927 Connecticut
passed the first automobile guest statute,5 a statute which ten years
later was repealed due to "unfavorable results."6 The rapid techno-
logical developments in the auto industry meant increased consump-
tion which, due to a proportionate increase in the number of accidents,
led to the enactment of guest legislation in other states, until today
twenty-seven states have automobile guest statutes. Any attempt to
crystallize these statutes is impossible due to the variety of provisions
and resulting interpretation. As the Ohio Supreme Court has properly
concluded:
Because of the great variety of terms, used in guest statutes of
the several states of the United States, relating to the quality or
degree of tortious conduct of an automobile host driver necessary to
create liability against him in favor of his guest, and because of the
careless use of language in court opinions and legal literature
describing these terms, great confusion has arisen in the matter
of applying them to specific uses.7
However, it can be readily seen that the purpose of all guest statutes is
twofold: (1) to protect against fraud and collusion, and (2) to pro-
tect the motorist (or owner) against liability for injuries to his occu-
pants, unless he is compensated for the transportation in an amount
substantially commensurate with the cost of the transportation-in
other words to preclude recovery by those who really have no moral
right to recover. Owing to these "commendable" purposes, only one
guest statute has even been held to be unconstitutional.8
4 For appropriate citations from these three states concerning this point, see 27
Mich. L. Rev. 458 (1929); 7 Notre Dame Lawyer 87 (1932); 6 Notre Dame Lawyer
300 (1931); 74 University of Pa. L. Rev. 86 (1925).
5 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1628 (1930).
6 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 340(E) (Supp. 1939).
7 Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 524, 80 N.E.2d 122, 126 (1948).
8 The Kentucky Guest Statute was held to be unconstitutional in Ludwig v. John-
son, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932). The court held that such legislation violated
Art. 54 of the Kentucky Constitution which reads in part, "The general assembly shall
have no power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or
for injuries to the person or property." The Ohio Guest Statute was held not to violate
the due process clause of the Constitution in Smith v. Williams, 51 Ohio App. 464,
1 N.E.2d 643 (1935).
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2. Analysis of the Statutory Standards of Other States
Following is a listing of the states which have enacted guest stat-
utes and a summary of the degree of care required of the owner or
operator toward his guest.
State
1. Alabama, Ala. Code tit. 36, § 95
(1940)
2. Arkansas, Ark. Stat. §§ 75-913,
(1947)
3. California (Vehicle § 17158)
(1959)
4. Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-9-1 (1953)
5. Delaware, Del. Code Ann. tit.
21, § 6101 (1953)
6. Florida, Fla. Stat. § 320.59
(1955)
7. Idaho, Idaho Code Ann. § 49-
1001 (1953)
8. Illinois, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch 95-
%, § 9-201 (1957)
9. Indiana, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 47-
1021 (1929).
10. Iowa, Iowa Code § 321.494
(1958)
11. Kansas, Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 8-122(b) (1949)
12. Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 256.29 (1948)
13. Montana, Mont. Rev. Code
Ann. §§ 32-1113 to 32-1116
(1931)
14. Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-
740 (1943)
15. Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 39-
740 (1931).
16. New Mexico, N. M. Stat. Ann.
§ 64-24-1,2 (1953)
17. North Dakota, N. D. Rev. Code
§ 39-1503 (1943)
18. Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code § 4515.02
(1953)
19. Oregon, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 30.110
(1953)
Degree of Care
Wilful or wanton misconduct.
Wilful and wanton operation in dis-
regard of the rights of others.
Intoxication; wilful misconduct.
Intentional; intoxication; wilful and
wanton disregard of the rights of
others.
Intentional accident; willful or wan-
ton disregard of the rights of
others.
Gross negligence; wilful and wanton
misconduct.
Intentional; intoxication; reckless
disregard of the rights of others.
Wilful and wanton misconduct.
Wanton or wilful misconduct.
Under influence of intoxicating liq-
uor; reckless operation.
Gross and wanton negligence.
Gross negligence; wilful and wanton
misconduct.
Grossly negligent; reckless opera-
tion.





reckless disregard of the rights of
others.
Intoxication; wilful misconduct or
gross negligence.
Wilful or wanton misconduct.
Intentional accident; intoxication;
reckless disregard of the rights of
others.
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20. South Carolina, S. C. Code
§ 46-801 (1952)
21. South Dakota, S. D. Code § 44-
.0362 (1939)
22. Texas, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art.
6701-b (1948)
23. Utah, Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-9-1,
41-9-2 (1953)
24. Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23,
§ 1491 (1959)
25. Virginia, Va. Code Ann. § 8-6461
(1950)
26. Washington, Wash. Rev. Code
§ 46-08.080 (1937)
27. Wyoming, Wyo. Comp. Stat.
Ann. § 60-1201 (1945)
Intentional accident; reckless disre-
gard of the rights of others; heed-
lessness.
Wilful and wanton misconduct.
Intentional accident; reckless disre-
gard of the rights of others.
Intoxication; wilful misconduct.
Gross negligence; wilful negligence
of the operator.
Gross negligence; wilful and wanton
disregard of the safety of the
person.
Intentional accident; gross negli-
gence; intoxication.
Gross negligence; wilful and wanton
misconduct.9
Thus, it appears that only Alabama and Indiana have statutes
exactly like that of Ohio in reference to the degree of care which an
owner or operator of a motor vehicle must exhibit to his guest. How-
ever, the statutes of Arkansas, Illinois and South Dakota are suffi-
ciently similar to classify them in the same general category as the
three mentioned above. It is interesting to note that ten of the twenty-
seven states have provisions allowing recovery for injuries sustained
due to the operator's intoxication. As shall be seen later, Ohio, as well
as the other states which have the wilful-wanton standard, tenaciously
holds that intoxication does not in itself constitute wilful or wanton
misconduct.
WHO IS A GUEST WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE?
In order for an injured occupant of an automobile to recover
damages resulting from the owner's or operator's negligence, he must
be a passenger rather than a guest within the meaning of the statute.
A guest, according to the Restatement of Torts, is:
one whom the owner or possessor of a motor car or other vehicle
invites or permits to ride with him as a gratuity, that is, without
any financial return except slight benefits it is customary to extend
as part of the ordinary courtesies of the road. 10
The Ohio Supreme Court interpreted the words "without payment
therefor" in the statute to mean that a guest is one:
9 An extremely helpful table of the states that have guest legislation and a resum6
of the courts' of each state's interpretation as to key words within the statute is listed
in 27 Ins. Counsel journal 223 (1960).
10 2 Restatement of Torts, § 490, at 1272 (1934).
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who is invited, either directly or by implication, to enjoy the hos-
pitality of the driver of a motor vehicle, who accepts such hospitality
and takes a ride either for his own pleasure or on his business with-
out making any return or conferring any benefit upon the driver of
the motor vehicle other than the mere pleasure of his company.1'
Unfortunately, application of any such definition is much more diffi-
cult than its formulation.
In some areas the law seems clear. For instance, the return or
payment need not come from the occupant himself,"2 nor is money
needed to constitute payment.13 Also, an actual business benefit does
not have to materialize, the only necessity being the existence of the
possibility of a business benefit at the start of the journey. Further-
more, a presumption of a guest relationship arises when the occupant
and driver are part of the same family.' 4
PAYMENT FOR TRANSPORTATION
In Duncan v. Hutckinson,"5 the Ohio Supreme Court attempted to
prescribe certain tests to determine when one actually "pays for his
transportation" and thus takes himself out of the operation of the
guest statute. The court concluded that payment is present: (1) when
the automobile host has a financial or business interest in the time or
service of the occupant, and the purpose of the transportation is to
take the occupant to or from his place of employment; (2) when the
occupant is making the trip to assist the automobile host in arriving
at the latter's destination or to perform some service for the latter's
benefit; (3) when a substantial or tangible benefit is conferred upon
the automobile host; (4) when the automobile host and occupant em-
bark upon a joint adventure or enterprise in which both are equally
interested, and the adventure or enterprise is of such moment and
character as to indicate that payment is the motivating influence in
11 Dorn v. Village of North Olmstead, 133 Ohio St. 375, 380, 14 N.E.2d 11, 14
(1938). This definition was adopted by the trial court and approved by the Supreme
Court.
12 Sprenger v. Braker, 71 Ohio App. 349, 49 N.E.2d 958 (1942) (transferring mem-
bers to lodge meeting in expectation lodge would pay for all) ; May v. Szwed, 68 Ohio
App. 459, 39 N.E.2d 630 (1941) (mother of plaintiff received transportation for daughter
as partial compensation for employment with the defendant).
13 Pheiffer v. Penn. Ry. Co., 60 Ohio L. Abs. 24 (1941); 168 F.2d 558. Hallgren v.
Wilson, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 652 (Ct. App. 1935) (part of compensation being to furnish
transportation to and from streetcar on day off).
14 Hasbrook v. Wingate, 152 Ohio St. 50, 87 N.E.2d 87 (1949) (Court emphasizes
that family relationship extremely important factor in establishing guest status.) But
see Henlin v. Wilson, 111 Ohio App. 516 (1961).
IS Duncan v. Hutchinson, 139 Ohio St. 185, 39 N.E.2d 140 (1942).
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providing for the transportation; and, (5) when the person is an
involuntary occupant of the automobile.
The application of the first criterion is most readily visualized in
Angel v. Constable,6 where the court held that there was payment
when the plaintiff was being driven home for dinner by the defendant-
employer, with the understanding that the plaintiff-employee would
return to work after eating. The court reasoned that a more efficient
performance by the employee for a longer length of time constitutes
payment. The second and third standards are exemplified in Dorn v.
Village of North Olmstead,'17 where it was held that one riding in the
defendant's automobile for the sole purpose of pointing out a location
to the latter, was a passenger rather than a guest. The most recent
pronouncement in this area by the supreme court came in Burrow v.
Porterfield,' where the court decided that:
the head of a children's division of a church who was riding in his
pastor's motor vehicle, at the pastor's request, in order to attend a
church conference dealing with business matters important to such
children's division, was [not a guest as a matter of law in such motor
vehicle] .... 19
The court reasoned that the knowledge gathered at the conference by
the plaintiff would indirectly benefit the pastor in such a manner as
to constitute "payment therefor."
The exact amount of benefit that has to be conferred upon the
owner or operator in order to make one a paying passenger is some-
what clouded due to the court of appeals decision in Sabo v. Mayn.20
There the defendant, an unlicensed driver, requested the plaintiff, a
licensed driver, to accompany him on a joy ride, so that the defendant
would not violate the requirements of his driving permit. The court
refused to allow the plaintiff to recover for his injuries sustained in the
ensuing accident due to defendant's negligence, holding in effect that
the plaintiff was a guest despite the fact that his only purpose in ac-
companying the defendant was to legally allow the latter to drive.
The fourth category of payment set out in the Duncan case has
been one of considerable controversy, since it is usually within the
confines of the words "joint adventure or enterprise" that the share-
the-expense problem arises. At first blush, it might appear that one's
sharing the expenses of an automobile trip constitutes payment there-
for and thus should remove the occupant from the guest statute. How-
10 Angel v. Constauble, 40 Ohio L. Abs. 1, 57 N.E.2d 86 (Ct. App. 1943).
17 Dorn v. Village of North Olmstead, supra note 11.
18 171 Ohio St. 28, 168 N.E.2d 137 (1960).
19 Burrow v. Porterfield, supra note 18 at 28, 168 N.E.2d at 437.
20 103 Ohio App. 113, 144 N.E.2d 248 (1956).
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ever, in the absence of a contract for payment, the Ohio courts refuse
to give this connotation to expense sharing in itself, and require a
business motive for the trip in addition to the sharing of the expenses."
To sidestep the "harshness" of this test in some circumstances,
the Ohio Supreme Court in at least one instance seemed to relax the
requirements of a business trip. In Lisner v. Faust22 the court held
that a child is a paying passenger and not a guest when he is being
transported from his home to his school in an automobile driven by
one of a group of parents who have entered into a definite mutual
agreement to participate in a car pool for the purpose of transporting
their children to and from school. The reciprocal arrangement consti-
tuted a benefit of a business-like nature and thus made the child a
paying passenger, even though the purpose of the trip was not business
as such. In Lisner, it appears that the court correctly looked to the
nature of the benefit conferred rather than the nature of the trip. Judi-
cial imposition of a business purpose into this standard is unfortunate
since often it is most difficult to ascertain the nature of a particular
trip to determine if it is social or business in character. Factors such
as the relationship between the occupant and motorist, nature or ob-
ject of the trip, and nature of the arrangement for payment must all
be carefully weighed in making this determination.23
The fifth test is a rather obvious one in that the court in Duncan
correctly reasoned that there can be no "involuntary guest." How-
ever, some sixteen years later, the same Ohio Supreme Court concluded
in Lombardo v. DeShance24 that "it is our conclusion that one may
become and be a guest in an automobile within the meaning of the
Ohio Guest Statute although he may be mentally incapable of accept-
ing an invitation to ride in that automobile."" In the Lombardo case,
the plaintiff, while intoxicated, was taken for a ride by the defendant
without the plaintiff's knowledge or consent. In reversing the lower
court, the supreme court held the plaintiff to be a guest, apparently in-
21 Jancar v. Knopie, 171 Ohio St. 165, 168 N.E.2d 407 (1960). (Defendant and
wife were going on motor trip and asked plaintiff and his wife to accompany them on
share expenses basis. Directed verdict for defendant upheld); Miller v. Fairley, 141
Ohio St. 327, 48 N.E.2d 217 (1943) (paying share of expenses on business trip (job) is
enough to make one a passenger); Ackerman v. Steiner, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 600, 59 N.E.2d
950. (Ct. App. 1944) (sharing expenses in going to bowling tournament not enough
to remove one from being guest); VoelkI v. Latin, 58 Ohio App. 245, 16 N.E.2d 519
(1938) (share expense arrangment to go to party not enough); Ernest v. Bellville, 53
Ohio App. 110, 4 N.E.2d 286 (1936) (share expense to go on fishing trip not enough).
22 168 Ohio St. 346, 155 N.E.2d 59 (1958).
23 For a complete listing of these factors, see Miller v. Fairley, supra note 21 at
337, 48 N.E.2d at 222.
24 167 Ohio St. 431, 149 N.E.2d 914 (1958).
26 Lombardo v. DeSbance, supra note 24 at 436, 149 N.E.2d at 908.
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corporating the business-social test into the area of the involuntary
guest. By its very meaning, guest implies consent to an invitation
and it seems only reasonable to infer that such consent should be a
prerequisite.
In summary, one is able to categorically list from the judicial
decisions, three factors, each of which helps to classify an occupant
of an automobile either as a guest or as a passenger: (1) the first is
to classify one as a guest or a passenger by examining the initial pur-
pose of the ride, that is, whether it has a business or social aspect; (2)
the second is to determine if there is an actual payment for the trans-
portation, understood by the parties to be such rather than a mere
expression of social amenities. Thus an actual contract between the
parties specifying that the rider is to pay for the transportation is
payment and makes one a passenger. (3) Finally, one can look at the
business benefit rendered to the occupant by the trip compared to that
enjoyed by the owner or driver. If an occupant confers a substantial
benefit upon the owner or operator, he will probably be a passenger
rather than a guest.
TERMINATION OF GUEST RELATIONSHIP
As mentioned above, the fifth criterion used in determining wheth-
er an occupant of an automobile is a guest is whether or not he is vol-
untarily riding in the automobile. Presumably, one who is in an auto-
mobile against his wishes is not a guest since the host-guest relation-
ship contemplates an acceptance of an invitation. Thus, it seems to
follow that one who begins a journey as a guest ceases to be such once
he demands to be let out of the automobile and the operator refuses.
Quite surprisingly, however, most states including Ohio (at least until
recently) hold that the host-guest relationship once established is not
terminable. 6 There appears to be no sound legal basis to justify such
a rule as all the usual requisites for a guest are missing. The Ohio Su-
preme Court in Redis v. Lynch"7 recently indicated a possible departure
from the conventional rule. There the plaintiff, a sixteen-year-old girl,
was offered a ride by the defendant to her house. The defendant per-
mitted one whom he knew to be an unlicensed driver to operate the
automobile. The driver, with the defendant's consent and against the
protests of the plaintiff, drove toward plaintiff's house on a much
longer route than that normally used. After the defendant had encour-
aged the operator to "drive faster" and the automobile reached a
speed of 90 m.p.h., an accident resulted and the plaintiff was seriously
injured. The lower court sustained the defendant's demurrer but the
26 For Ohio's position here see 5 Cleve-Mar. L. Rev. 101 (1956).
27 169 Ohio St. 305, 159 N.E.2d 597 (1959).
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supreme court reversed holding that a jury question was raised as to
whether the plaintiff had remained a guest for the entire trip.2
WILFUL OR WANTON MISCONDUCT
Polonius: "What do you hear, my Lord?"
Hamlet: "Words, words, words." 29
The Ohio Guest Statute provides that in order for a guest to re-
cover damages for the negligent operation of an automobile, it is nec-
essary that his injuries be proximately caused by the wilful or wanton
misconduct of the host.30 Unfortunately, after some twenty-seven years
of application, the Ohio courts are far from unanimity in defining wilful
or wanton, although they do agree that they differ from mere negli-
gence, 31 and it is error to charge that they are the same.32
Since wilful misconduct connotes intentional wrongdoing, its ap-
plication to specific fact situations has not been difficult.
"Wilful misconduct" on the part of the motorist within the meaning
of the Ohio Guest Statute . . . is either the doing of an act with
specific intent to injure his passenger or, with full knowledge of
existing conditions, the intentional execution of a wrongful course
of conduct which he knows should not be carried out or the inten-
tional failure to do something which he knows should be done in
connection with the operation of his automobile, under circum-
stances tending to disclose that the motorist knows or should know
that an injury to his guest will be the probable result of such con-
duct.33
Thus, as evidenced by the pronouncement of the supreme court above,
wilful misconduct may be either actual or constructive-the former
anchored on an actual intent to injure, while the latter is predicated
on an intentional act or refusal to act coupled with an absolute indiffer-
ence to the safety of others as evidenced by knowledge of the existing
danger-a constructive intent to injure.3 4
Wanton misconduct, on the other hand, means that the actor's
conduct is of "an unreasonable character, in disregard of a risk known
28 The court also intimated that a jury question was presented as to whether the
defendant's conduct amounted to wilful or wanton misconduct.
29 Hamlet, Act II, scene 2.
30 § 4515.02 Ohio Rev. Code (1933).
31 Akers v. Stirn, 136 Ohio St. 245, 25 N.E.2d 286 (1940); Universal Concrete
Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 200 N.E. 843 (1936). Still some early courts used
the term wilful or wanton negligence. See Higbee Co. v. Jackson, 101 Ohio St. 75, 128
N.E. 61 (1920).
32 Reserve Trucking Co. v. Fairchild, 128 Ohio St. 519, 191 N.E. 745 (1934).
33 Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 122, 80 N.E.2d 122 (1948).
34 For a very worthwhile discussion of wilful or wanton misconduct, see 6 Ohio
Jur. 2d "Automobiles" § 226 (1954).
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to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it,
and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.""5
The Ohio Supreme Court defined wantonness in Universal Concrete
Pipe Co. v. Bassett,36 a non-guest case, as follows:
wanton misconduct is such conduct as manifests a disposition to
perversity, and it must be under such surrounding circumstances
and existing conditions that the party doing the act or failing to
act must be conscious, from his knowledge of such surrounding
circumstances and existing conditions, that his conduct will in all
probability result in injury. . . . Wantonness is a synonym for
what is popularly known as cussedness and cussedness is a disposi-
tion to perversity.37
The continued application of this definition by the Ohio courts
has led to unjustifiable results. Certainly, the popular notion of "cuss-
edness" and "disposition to perversity" invoke a spirit of ill-will or
wickedness which borders very closely to wilful misconduct. Perhaps
it is true that the subtle legal distinction between wilful and wanton
is so slight as not to merit distinction.. However, the two terms should
not be confused to the extent that they foreshadow liability for injuries
resulting from conduct short of that designed to ensue in intentional
injury.
In Haacke v. Lease,38 the motorist turned to observe a group of
buildings and continued driving for a quarter mile without watching
the highway. The court could find no wantonness in his conduct, say-
ing there was no actual knowledge of a great probability of harm.
judge Hornbeck, in a strong dissent, asserted that a person should be
charged with knowledge of the natural and probable consequences of
his acts, stating: "If such acts, under all the circumstances, do not
constitute wanton misconduct, I can conceive of no conduct that could
be so characterized."3 9 Other courts have acquiesced in the require-
ment of actual knowledge,4° while at least one court correctly agreed
with the reasoning of judge Hornbeck.4
In Hellerin v. Dixon,42 the supreme court reversed the lower
courts and allowed no recovery where the plaintiff-occupant was killed
as the defendant-motorist drove his twelve-year-old automobile "as fast
as he could"43 uphill in a rainstorm on a slippery pavement. The court
35 Prosser, Torts, § 33 at 151 (1955).
36 Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, supra note 31.
37 Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, supra note 31 at 843-45.
38 35 Ohio L. Abs. 381, 41 N.E.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1941).
39 Id. at 392.
40 Vecchio v. Vecchio, 131 Ohio St. 59, 1 N.E.2d 624 (1936).
41 Patterson v. Garrison, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 226 (Ct. App. 1937).
42 152 Ohio St. 40, 86 N.E.2d 777 (1949).
43 Id. at 45, 86 N.E.2d at 780.
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concluded that there was no "disposition to perversity" since there was
only a chance that injury would result, there being a wide gap between
chance and probability. 4 One of the most recent opinions rendered by
the supreme court is Birmelin v. Gist45 where testimony was presented
to the effect that the motorist, while speeding, changed his speed and
swerved from one side of the road to the other in a manner so as to
prevent a truck that was following him from passing. All of the oc-
cupants of the automobile were killed in the resulting accident, but
the court was unable to find wanton misconduct since no evidence
was presented that the driver realized that his conduct would in all
probability result in injury-the court refused to "guess what had
happened." No wonder lower courts are prone to tag wantonness as
the legal equivalent of wilfulness.46
VIOLATION OF STATUTE
Another vulnerable area of the Ohio courts is the frequent pro-
nouncement that violation of a statute by a motorist is not enough in
itself to constitute wilful or wanton misconduct. Thus, excessive
speed 4 7 bad judgment, and the like are not enough to show a disposi-
tion to perversity.48 Fortunately, wantonness can be found where a
statute is violated coupled with "unusually dangerous surroundings
showing a knowing disregard of another's safety. ' 49 However, wanton-
ness could not be found where:
a driver of a car, who upon approaching an intersection of two state
highways at a rate of speed between 55 and 60 m.p.h., observed a
car to his right approaching the intersection, then proceeds to look
at the baggage on his running board to see if it is secure and then
at his wristwatch for the purpose of checking the correctness of his
speedometer, fails to notice a traffic light at the intersection or
44 But see Judge Zimmerman's dissent where he says, "Based upon the described
conduct of the driver, which in our opinion showed a reckless disregard of consequences
and the rights of others, the jury was justified in finding the existence of the elements
comprising wanton misconduct .... " Id. at 48, 86 N.E.2d at 78.
45 162 Ohio St. 98, 120 N.E.2d 711 (1954).
46 See Headnote 3 of McCoy v. Faulkenberg, 53 Ohio App. 98, 4 N.E.2d 281 (1935)
"The character of an act as wilful or wanton must be determined by whether the mis-
conduct is a wilful disregard of the just rights or safety of others ...or a wantonness
that is the legal equivalent of wilfulness." In the McCoy case, an intoxicated motorist
returning from a party was found not guilty of wilful or wanton misconduct when he
drove his automobile 45 m.p.h. on a city street turning in and out of traffic, striking a
pole, which killed a passenger.
47 Kennard v. Palmer, 143 Ohio St. 1, 53 N.E.2d 908 (1944).
48 For another case where violation of a safety statute did not amount to wilful
or wanton misconduct, see Thomas v. Williams, 54 Ohio L. Abs. 94, 86 N.E.2d 801
(1948).
49 Kennard v. Palmer, supra note 47 at 4, 53 N.E.2d at 908.
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make any observation of the highway on which he is traveling, and,
when his attention is called to the car approaching on the inter-
secting road, accelerates his car in such a manner as to pass in front
of such approaching car and becomes involved in a collision with it,
is, as a matter of law, not guilty of wilful or wanton misconduct
so as to be liable in damages for the death of a guest passenger in
his automobile.50
Although violation of one statute may not amount to wantonness,
a series of negligent acts such as those mentioned above add up to
something more than mere negligence-indeed, they amount to wan-
tonness. In interpreting wantonness, Ohio courts seem to have placed
too much emphasis on the requirement of an intentional ill will to
cause injury rather than on an examination of the facts of each case
and a determination of the degree of risk involved in that particular
conduct by the motorist. Certainly, wantonness should be found where
a series of negligent acts augment the degree of risk to the extent illus-
trated by the above set of facts. In short, wanton misconduct should
also be found where there is no intent to injure.
Finally, the most recent decision by the Ohio Supreme Court
indicates that the court will be "hard put" to find wanton misconduct.
In Tonti v. Paglia,5 ' the court sustained the defendant's demurrer to
a petition in which it was alleged that the defendant permitted her
minor son, whom she knew to be a reckless driver, to operate her auto-
mobile and as a result of the minor's negligence, the plaintiff was in-
jured. In adhering to "rigid precedent," the court concluded that the
"entrustment of the motor vehicle to such [an] incompetent person
does not, in itself, constitute wilful or wanton misconduct. 5 2
In effect, then, Ohio courts have adjudicated wantonness out of
the Guest Statute. Whether the Ohio legislature intended that wilful
and wanton be used in the disjunctive by the inclusion of "or" is more
than an academic question, but need not concern us here. Actual wilful
misconduct has been applied to acts initiated by an intent to injure.
Wantonness in effect has been given the same meaning due to the "dis-
position to perversity" clich6 followed so religiously by the courts.
More important, in so construing the terms, courts have failed to clas-
sify, either as wilful or wanton, conduct which takes place in light of
such a great risk that even a "reasonably negligent" person would not
act in a similar manner. Surely one who acts in light of such a meas-
urable risk ought to be held to the sound legal maxim that a person
is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his volun-
tary acts.
50 Headnote of Murphy v. Snyder, 63 Ohio App. 423, 27 N.E.2d 152 (1937).
51 171 Ohio St. 520, 172 N.E.2d 618 (1961).
52 Id. at 523, 172 N.E.2d at 620.
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It is imperative that if wilful and wanton are to be merged, courts
must recognize that continuance of misconduct after knowledge (actual
or constructive) of the danger involved often amounts to a reckless
disregard for the safety of others, and therefore is certainly wilful or
wanton. Regardless of the labels attached to different kinds of con-
duct, and regardless of whether wantonness is the legal equivalent of
wilfulness, "all the circumstances presumably known to the driver
should be considered; his physical condition, the weather, highway
conditions, traffic, the speed of his vehicle and all facts which indicate
that the danger was glaringly apparent." 3 These factors along with
the mental attitude of the driver (either subjective or objective) before
and at the time of the accident must be the guidelines in the determi-
nation of wilful or wanton misconduct. A case by case adjudication
would seem to be much preferable to the apparently stereotype "cuss-
edness" test existing today.
SOLUTION-JUDICIAL RE-EXAMINATION OR REPEAL
OF THE GUEST STATUTE
Despite controversial judicial interpretation and application of
the Guest Statute, the question remains as to the merits of any legis-
lation which changes the common law liability of a motorist to his
guest. This question has become especially relevant as a result of
recent attempts to repeal the Ohio Guest Statute 4
Those who advocate the necessity of a guest statute claim such
protection is needed for the "good Samaritan" motorist who extends
his kindness by means of giving a "lift" to a neighbor or a weary trav-
eler. They argue that it would be a gross imposition to expose such a
motorist to liability for his mere negligence as this would be a prime
example of the proverbial ingratitude of "the dog that bites the hand
that feeds him." Furthermore, it is argued that the repeal of the guest
statute means collusion, perjury and fraud. Since many guests are
53 3 W. Res. L. Rev. 170 (1957).
54 In 1949, a bill was introduced in the Ohio General Assembly, H. B. 546, to
amend the guest statute so as to subject motorists to liability for injuries resulting from
their negligence except as to those plaintiffs of first degree of kinship to the motorist.
Such an amendment, it was hoped, would allow recovery in the normal case but still
prevent collusive suits. In the 102d and 103d General Assembly in 1947 and 1959
respectively, H.B.'s 748 and 147 were introduced, the purpose of which was to com-
pletely repeal the Guest Statute. Although both bills were recommended for passage by
the Judiciary Committee, both failed to receive the required number of votes for passage.
A great deal of appreciation is extended to Mr. Robert Bayley of Clark County who
introduced H.B. 157 for taking time to give his views on the subject of the repeal of
the Guest Statute. Some of the arguments advanced in this paper for the repeal of
the Guest Statute coincide with the views of Mr. Bayley, given to this writer in an
interview on April 19, 1960.
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family members or friends of the insured driver, the incentive for fraud
and the difficulties in combating the same become self-evident-hus-
band will sue wife, brother will sue sister, etc. Also, it is felt that
many claims, entirely without merit, would be made against motorists
and subject them or their insurance companies to "blackmail" by facing
them with the alternative of the cost of a "nuisance" settlement or the
expense of a carefully prepared trial. Such guest claims as these, it
is argued, would place an unwarranted burden upon the insuring pub-
lic in the form of higher automobile insurance rates, as the cost of
automobile liability insurance is directly proportional to the total
amount of claims paid by the companies.
Finally, it should be remembered that a "Medical Payments Cov-
erage" currently can be purchased as part of an automobile insurance
policy which, in effect, protects a guest by payment of all reasonable
medical expenses incurred within one year after the accident.
Arguments for the repeal of the existing Ohio Guest Statute are
greater numerically and also more sound economically, sociologically,
and legally. To return to the common law rule would only mean that
the driver has the same duty of care to those within his automobile as
to those whom he meets on the street. The Ohio Guest Statute in effect
makes an occupant a trespasser when he actually is a social invitee.
Since speed and the violation of other safety statutes are proba-
bly the greatest causes of automobile accidents,55 it follows that these
types of misconduct which are negligent, but never wilful or wanton
in themselves say the courts, are the greatest causes of injuries and
deaths to the passengers. Vet the Ohio Guest Statute tells the driver,
the one person who can do the most to prevent injuries to his passen-
gers, that as to pedestrians and persons in other automobiles, he must
conduct himself reasonably; however, as to the "trespassing" guest, he
can be as unreasonable as he pleases just so long as he is not guilty of
wilful or wanton misconduct. Moreover, if the injured guest is a wage
earner, we are really shifting the burden of the driver's negligence to
the guests' dependents, and this often shifts the burden from an
admittedly negligent driver. No wonder it is vehemently argued that
guest statutes do not reflect people's sentiments but rather are crea-
tures of the insurance companies.
That the repeal of the Guest Statute would raise insurance rates
is at the most mere speculation. Besides, Ohio's insurance rates already
reflect the risk of the insured driver negligently injuring his passenger,




because any Ohio driver would be so liable in any of the states which
do not have guest legislation (Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and West Vir-
ginia included). Moreover, a study has indicated that there is no
consistency in rates when comparing those states which have guest
legislation and those states which do not. 6 Those who argue that no
guest statute will lead to collusive suits designed to defraud insurance
companies are perhaps on more secure ground. However, those who
so argue fail to recognize that such suits can be avoided by prompt and
thorough investigations of accidents by responsible authorities and in-
surance companies. Acknowledging the fact that there remains a risk
of fraud in every law suit, judicial machinery is today designed to
combat such fraud. The repeal of the guest statute would still mean
that the plaintiff must show first that he was in fact injured; second,
that the driver's negligent conduct was the proximate cause of the
injury; and third that he, the passenger, was not contributorily negli-
gent in bringing about the injury nor did he assume the risk of his
driver's negligent conduct. Moreover, collusive suits are even a pos-
sibility today under the Ohio Guest Statute if the driver is willing to
falsely admit to misconduct which even the Ohio courts will recognize
as being wilful or wanton. Besides, should honest claims ever be denied
so as to prevent possible fraudulent recoveries?
The most serious concern with the Ohio Guest Statute today stems
from the often harsh, inhuman and cruel results of cases litigated
under the statute. Admittedly, much of the blame for these results can
be directly placed on the Ohio courts' fusion of wilful and wanton.
In addition to the "unjust" decisions already enumerated, one need
only examine Bailey v. Huff"7 to see the undesirable situation guests
find themselves in today. In this case, the driver admitted driving
while intoxicated. After the defendant narrowly missed colliding with
a truck, the plaintiff requested that the defendant let him drive and
upon refusal, in vain asked to be let out of the automobile. The de-
fendant, while turning left, collided with an oncoming automobile.
The defendant's motion for a directed verdict was sustained by the
Franklin County Common Pleas Court. Decisions such as this lead to
an "uneasy" situation-perhaps even more so than allowing a hitch-
hiker to recover from a good samaritan motorist for the latter's "ordi-
nary negligence." Whether the Legislature should take cognizance of
such decisions as Bailey and act accordingly remains to be answered,
56 This study was conducted by Robert Bayley of Clark County and the results
given to this writer in my interview with Mr. Bayley on April 19, 1960.
57 78 Ohio L. Abs. 183, 152 N.E.2d 162 (C.P. 1953) ; aff'd, 152 N.E.2d 166 (1957).
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and the answer will depend upon one's personal convictions about
guest legislation.
Finally, the Guest Statute means that if X and his Siamese cat
are riding in my automobile, and both are killed by Z's negligence (for
instance, driving 90 m.p.h. through a stop sign), X's estate can recover
for the value of the cat since the Guest Statute does not apply to
property. Moreover, Z could be sentenced to manslaughter for X's
death. But X's wife and children could recover nothing for X's injuries
or death. Should not our society be more interested in the preserva-
tion of life and limb than in the protection of property?
CONCLUSION
The present status of guest legislation in Ohio is undesirable
both for the guest and for the public. Thirty years of judicial interpre-
tation have resulted in much dissatisfaction. Moreover, the dissatis-
faction has led to a serious examination of the merits of a guest statute
in our present day society, and this examination has illuminated
the undesirable characteristics inherent in such legislation. The fact
that passengers constituted 43.2% of all injuries and 31.7% of all
deaths in Ohio for 1959"8 is perhaps reason enough in itself to suggest
there is no longer any sound basis for guest legislation today as there
was in the "hitchhiker era" of the early 1930's. Even assuming that
percentages for 1930 and 1960 remained constant, the increase in total
accidents should concern us. It is most imperative that the increased
automobile injury and death toll accelerated by the increased use of
the automobile be checked by some method. Any incentive, no matter
how small, which would decrease the appalling highway slaughter of
today should be advanced.
Four possible remedies appear to be open: (1) a judicial change
in the interpretation of wilful or wanton; (2) legislative change in the
degree of care owed a guest, such as a change from wanton misconduct
to gross negligence which might be more susceptible to a "better"
judicial interpretation; (3) a legislative pronouncement as to the mean-
ing of wilful or wanton; and (4) repeal of the guest statute entirely.
Since the courts appear to be bound in this area by stare decisis and
self created legal dogma, we must look to the legislature for relief.
Oddly enough, the door is wide open for the Ohio Supreme Court has
recognized that, "however the guest statute was not of judicial origin,
it is a legislative enactment and as long as it exists, courts must abide
by its terms and be governed by its provisions."
It is fully recognized that guest legislation is desirable for the
58 Supra note 53.
59 Birmelin v. Gist, supra note 42 at 108.
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encouragement of social amenities, and the elimination of fraudulent
suits. But it is time to re-examine our society and determine whether
such values override the urgent need to "discourage" in whatever man-
ner possible the highway death toll. In short it is time to determine
whether the Ohio Guest Statute is one of those principles that has
served its day and has no place in modern day society.
Ronald K. Bennington
